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ABSTRACT 
In the debate concerning a country’s structural weaknesses there is an 
obvious neglect of space issues, an important component of which is regional 
imbalances. Yet, the persistence of such imbalances within countries has 
dictated the continuous investigation of their causes and of the required 
policy reforms for their reduction. Structural changes, economic integration 
on a global or regional scale and economic crises have been considered major 
factors for increasing or decreasing domestic regional concentration and 
disparities, while economic policy can mitigate (or strengthen) their effect. 
This paper attempts to examine and critically evaluate the above issues for the 
case of Greece, where regional inequalities, measured by per capita GDP, have 
widened over time consolidating the country’s polarized structure and where 
restrictive macroeconomic measures as well as regional policy implemented 
through the Community Support Frameworks appear to have been 
inadequate in most cases or even to have intensified the above picture. A 
discussion of future prospects under Greece’s current difficult situation is 
attempted in the conclusions. 
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Economic Restructuring, Crises  
and the Regions: The Political Economy  
of Regional Inequalities in Greece 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The persistence of regional inequalities within countries in the course of 
economic integration/globalization has dictated the continuous 
investigation of their causes and remedies (i.e. the policy measures 
required for their reduction) - and, on the theoretical level, the 
contestation of the neoclassical paradigm of convergence - which 
coincides with that of ‘disequilibrium’ space theories assuming more 
advanced stages of economic integration. Yet, regional imbalances are 
rarely taken into consideration in discussions or analyses concerning a 
country’s structural weaknesses including its relatively low competitive 
position.  
For the EU case in particular, a number of studies have pointed out that 
half of the income inequalities existing between member states are 
attributed to regional inequalities within individual countries which 
threaten EU cohesion (Dall’ Erba 2003; Caraveli et al., 2008; Martin 1999, 
2004; Petrakos et al., 2003; Puga, 2002;). Among the factors affecting a 
country’s internal economic geography and regional imbalances, 
economic integration on a regional (European) or global level and 
economic downturns have been the objects of substantial research. For 
example, Galbraith (2011) supports that in contemporary economies, 
globalization (which he defines as the global terms of trade between 
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sectors), rather than internal structural change, plays the dominant role 
in determining the movements of inequality both between and within 
countries, describing the period 1972-1980 as one of moderately 
declining inequality and the period 1980-2000 (which coincided with the 
global debt crisis of the ‘80s and the wave of deregulation and 
liberalization in Asia in the 1990s), as one of sharply rising inequalities. In 
particular, he claims that “economic crises tend to raise unemployment, 
shift the share of income towards capital and worsen the distribution of 
pay” (p. 24). This could imply an increase in geographical concentration 
to big urban centres and a rise in disparities, assuming that higher 
unemployment rates prevail in peripheral areas. Many studies on EU 
economic cycles also show that regional disparities tend to rise in 
periods of severe recessions and fall in periods of economic growth 
(referred to in Petrakos & Psycharis, 2004; Petrakos, 2009). This is largely 
the outcome of the restrained fiscal policy measures imposed in such 
periods (as in the downturn of the 80s in OECD countries) which ‘hit’ 
harder the weakest regions or lead to chronic structural imbalances, 
failing to generate convergence at the national or regional level (see for 
example, Argeitis, 2005). The above topics have acquired increased 
significance after the outbreak of the current debt crisis, from 2008-09 
onwards, and the adoption of the ‘austerity measures’ which it 
necessitated. Indeed, statistical evidence reveals that the unequal 
geographical impact of these developments has been substantial (see for 
example Kitson et al., 2011; Monastiriotis, 2011). In contrast to these 
findings, many researchers have shown that during periods of economic 
crisis, a reversal of concentration trends with a tendency towards 
regional convergence becomes apparent, as the highest income sectors 
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(mainly in technology and in finance) enjoy their greatest income growth 
in boom times, whether driven by domestic investment or by exports, 
and thus income and inequality rise together (see Petrakos and Saratsis, 
2000; Petrakos & Artelaris, 2008; Petrakos, 2009).  
This paper shows the trend in regional inequalities in Greece, a southern 
European country severely hit by the on-going financial and economic 
crisis, and attempts to relate it to some of the above factors. Measured 
by per capita GDP, internal inequalities have widened over time, 
resulting to the consolidation of a centre-periphery pattern, 
characterized by the augmentation of the capital region’s (Attica) size, 
and the widening of the gap between this region and the rest of the 
country. While restrictive macro-economic measures adopted from the 
mid-80s onward have probably adversely affected the regional 
distribution of resources and economic activity, regional policy, 
implemented through the Community Support Frameworks, has proved 
inadequate to reverse the above trends. The methodological approach is 
based on: the statistical documentation of regional inequalities in 
Greece and the graphical presentation of their evolution in the period 
1995/97-2007/9 (Section 2); an examination of regional inequalities 
within the context of general structural imbalances of the Greek 
economy with reference to general macroeconomic policy measures 
over past decades (Section 3); an evaluation of the role of regional policy 
implemented through the Community Support Frameworks (CSFs) 
(Section4 and an assessment of future prospects in this context under 
Greece’s current difficult position in the conclusions.  
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2.  Regional disparities in Greece 
Tables 1 and 2, which show, respectively, per capita GDP in Greek 
regions and the regional allocation of gross value added by sector of 
production in year 2008, reveal the polar development model, or the 
core-periphery pattern, of the Greek economy.     
Table 1 shows the superiority of the Attica region (followed by South 
Aegean) in terms of per capita GDP and Table 2 shows the concentration 
of economic activity in Attica and Central Macedonia (the region of the 
sub-capital, Thessalonica). Thus, dynamic sectors, representing 
‘entrepreneurial activity’, are heavily concentrated in Attica (in 
particular, 34,4% of secondary and 55% of tertiary activities in total gross 
value added are located in the capital region), followed by Central 
Macedonia (which hosts 17% and 12,7% of the same sectors, 
respectively). As a result, half of the country’s GDP is produced in Attica 
and 14% in Central Macedonia. 
TABLE 1: Per capita GDP in Greek regions (2008) 
Region Per capita GDP (country = 100) 
Attica 137.67 
South Aegean 103.76 
Mainland Greece (Sterea Ellada) 90.95 
Crete 90.26 
Peloponnesus 82.14 
Western Macedonia 82.12 
Ionian islands 79.05 
Central Macedonia 78.06 
Thessaly 73.88 
Epirus 73.18 
Northern Aegean 72.19 
Eastern Macedonia & Thrace 67.22 
Western Greece 64.43 
Source: Greek National Statistical Authority. Regions - NUTS II level. 
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TABLE 2: Gross value added by region and sector of production-2008 (% 
in the country’s gross value added) 
Regions 
Primary  
sector 
Secondary 
sector 
Tertiary  
sector 
Eastern Macedonia & Thrace 8.4 4.5 3.3 
Central Macedonia 20.3 17.0 12.7 
Western Macedonia 4.0 4.4 1.6 
Thessaly 11.9 6.3 4.2 
Epirus 4.7 2.4 2.2 
Ionian islands 1.6 1.3 1.7 
Western Greece 11.2 5.1 3.8 
Mainland Greece (Sterea Ellada) 9.6 10.0 2.9 
Peloponnesus 9.4 7.5 3.4 
Attica 4.9 34.4 55.0 
North Aegean 2.2 1.1 1.3 
South Aegean 2.0 2.3 3.0 
Crete 9.8 3.9 4.9 
Country total 3.7 19.0 77.3 
Source: Greek National Statistical Authority. Regions - NUTS II level. Own calculations. 
 
The persistence over time, and  in most cases the widening, of regional 
inequalities in Greece has been confirmed by the empirical analysis of 
Caraveli & Tsionas (2011) and graphically presented in Figures 1 and 2, 
which show the rising divergence of all regions from the national 
average and the capital region respectively
1
. 
                                                 
1
 Using data from the Greek National Statistical Authority and Eurostat, regional disparities, 
relative to the country average, were examined by developing graphs of log rtrt
t
YV
Y
= , 
where 
rtY  is real per capita GDP in region r ( 1,...,r R= ) and time t  ( 1,...,t T= ), while tY  is 
the national level of GDP per capita.  Essentially 
rtV  is a measure of ‘sigma convergence’. 
Regional disparities relative to Attica are estimated with the use of measure
0
log rtrt
t
YV
Y
= , 
where 0tY  is Attica’s GDP per capita (see Caraveli & Tsionas, 2011). 
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FIGURE 1: Regional disparities in Greece (relative to national GDP per 
capita) 
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Source: Reproduced from Caraveli & Tsionas (2011). 
 
 
Figure 1 shows rising disparities of all regions relative to the country-
average. Mainland Greece and South Aegean appear to be the 
exception, as their divergence from the average decreases until 2002, 
but increases thereafter. Western Greece seems to be another region 
with a ‘break’ in its divergence around 2003, but an overall rising trend 
in its disparity from the average. The constantly rising trend in Attica’s 
disparity shows its continuous augmentation relatively to the rest of the 
country.  
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Similarly, in Figure 2, all regions are shown to diverge from Attica, with 
the exception of Western and mainland Greece, which show 
convergence in certain periods (2003 and 2000, respectively) and 
divergence afterwards
2
. The reversal of this trend towards divergence is 
basically due to the revision of GDP after 2000
3
, which upgraded the 
position of prefectures and regions heavily oriented towards tertiary 
sector activities (mostly Attica & South Aegean) – e.g. tourism, trade, 
public administration, real estate, etc. - at the expense of mountainous 
as well as inland prefectures of mainland Greece.  
The latter are the areas still characterized by a strong dependence on 
the primary sector, a relatively small presence of the tertiary sector and 
lack of significant urban centres. The polarized structure of development 
was as a result further consolidated, with the strengthening of the 
largest urban concentration in the country - the metropolitan area of 
Athens (Papadaskalopoulos & Christofakis, 2007). 
                                                 
2
 The trend towards convergence of mainland Greece is due to the fact that this region has 
become a site of industry location, resulting to a remarkable improvement in its relative 
income position at both the national and the EU level - a development which led to its 
exclusion from objective 1 of the structural funds and its gradual entrance in objective 2. 
3
 The new method of calculating GDP was based on the co-estimation of the “unrecorded” or 
“non-observed”, “hidden and informal”, sector of the economy, amounting to about 30-40% 
of real economic activity (Michailidis 2009, p. 411, Papadaskalopoulos and Christophakis 
2007). 
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FIGURE 2: Regional disparities in Greece (relative to Attica’ GDP per 
capita) 
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Source: Caraveli & Tsionas (2011). 
 
The rising disparities of Greek regions resulted in their divergence from 
the EU average, measured by real (PPS) per capita GDP of EU-27, in the 
period 1996-2007: Only Attica’s and South Aegean’s shares rose - the 
former from 87% in 1996 to 128% in 2007 and the latter from 94% to 
96% - while the share of mainland Greece fell dramatically - from 129% 
to 84%. Income disparities in Greece, measured by the coefficient of 
variation, increased, on average, from 10% in 1996 to 27% in 2007, 
whereas in the EU as a whole, they decreased from 32,5% to 28,3%, 
respectively (European Commission, 2007). 
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3.  Regional as part of general structural imbalances and 
macroeconomic policy 
The persistence (in the long-run) of regional inequalities in Greece with 
the strengthening of the leading position of the Attica region constitutes 
a serious structural problem, which several authors have attributed to a 
combination of factors. Such factors are historic (for example factors 
that led to the establishment of the capital region in the specific 
location), geomorphologic (e.g. the high proportion of less-favoured, 
mountainous and insular, areas), economic (e.g. economies of 
agglomeration, quality of human resources, European economic 
integration, etc.) and political, such as the centralized structure of public 
governance (Kostopoulou 2009; Petrakos 2009). Added to the severe 
structural imbalances characterizing the overall economy in the past 
three decades – reflected in the swelling debt, high government deficit, 
rising unemployment and a serious production or ‘supply deficit’, leading 
to a low export potential/low competitiveness – the ‘regional problem’ 
contributes to limiting the economy’s possibilities to develop, by 
inhibiting the exploitation of the periphery’s resources (see also 
Petrakos 2009: 374).  
Regional imbalances have quite naturally been shaped by structural 
changes taking place in the Greek economy in the past 50 years or so, 
reflected in the substantial reduction of the agricultural sector’s share in 
both GDP (from nearly 24% in 1961 to 2,4% in 2010) and labour force 
(from 52% to about 12% in the same period)
4
, the significant rise in the 
share of industry until about 1981 and the relatively much higher share 
                                                 
4
 This share is still large compared to EU-27 average, which in 2010 was 1,1%  in GDP and 
5,1% in total population.  
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of services through the whole period
5
. The trend in the allocation of 
gross fixed capital formation by sector of economic activity in Greece in 
the last decade, shown in Table 3, reflects another important structural 
change, the rise in the relative importance of ‘producer and consumer 
services’ (finance and real estate), as well as of commercial activities
6
, at 
the expense of ‘real production’, i.e., ‘industry’ and ‘construction’. Such 
structural changes contributed to the widening of regional disparities by 
strengthening urbanization trends and concentration in metropolitan 
centres. 
TABLE 3: Structure (%) of Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Greece: 
2000-2007 
Sector of economic activity  2000 2004  2007  
Agriculture, etc. 4,2 4,2 5,6 
Industry (including energy) 13 7,6 7,8 
Construction 1,3 1,2 2,2 
Commerce, hotels, transport 20 27,5 24,1 
Finance and real estate 37,5 39,9 43,1 
Other services 23,8 19,1 16,9 
Source: Greek Statistical Authority. 
The whole post-war period can be divided into two large sub-periods, 
which differ in economic success and dynamism. The period between 
1950 and 1973 was a dynamic one (see Figure 3), signaling the way 
towards modernization, expressed by the high growth rates in GDP 
(ranging from 5 to 8%), public debt below 20% and a surplus government 
                                                 
5
 The share of agriculture in total regional gross value added ranges from 0,4% in Attica to 
over 9% in Thessaly and western Greece, while the corresponding share of the secondary 
sector ranges from around 13% in Attica to about 39% in western Macedonia and 42% in 
mainland Greece; the share of services ranges from 50% in mainland Greece to 86% in Attica 
and 82% in south Aegean (Greek Statistical Authority, 2008 - own calculations). 
6
 These however were traditionally the activities in which small and medium private capital 
preferred to invest (due to their high profitability), whereas large capital (i.e. shipping 
capital) chose to invest in maritime activities (see Serafetinidis et al. 1981, p. 299). 
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budget. The successful economic performance of this period was largely 
due to foreign exchange inflows (foreign aid and emigrants’ 
remittances
7
), which raised domestic demand and reduced trade 
deficits, but also to the boom in the world economy which contributed 
to boosting Greek shipping and tourism. In fact, in 1974 “gross receipts 
from shipping became the most important item of invisible receipts 
accounting for 36% of gross receipts, while net receipts from shipping 
covered 25% of the deficit in the balance of trade for that year” 
(Serafetinidis et al., 1981: 298)
8
. Economic policy was instrumental to 
this success, as in the 50s and 60s, Greece implemented import 
substitution policies in order to achieve self-sufficiency in a number of 
products (mainly wheat), but also to promote the development of 
industry. As a result, the period 1961-73 was one of rapid 
industrialization, in which the share of industry in GDP rose from 28% to 
33% and in total exports from around 14% to nearly 70%, labour 
productivity in the industrial sector nearly tripled and new industrial 
branches (mainly in heavy industry) emerged
9
 (Fragiadis, 2010). This 
impressive economic performance however also implied the substantial 
                                                 
7
 Internal migration (from rural to urban areas, mainly to the capital) was evident since the 
mid-1950s, but the decade of the 1960s marked the second big wave of emigration abroad, 
this time to W. Europe, following a contract signed between the governments of W. 
Germany and Greece. 
8
 For a thorough and well documented analysis of the substantial role of Greek shipping 
capital in the development of Greek capitalism see Serafetinidis et al, 1981. 
9
 Serafetinidis et al, 1981 (p. 300) note that “heavy industry branches were precisely those 
into which most of the foreign capital inflow was directed. Part of this capital consisted of 
shipping capital and was mainly concentrated in branches closely related to shipping 
activities, e.g. oil refineries, shipyards, etc.” Fragiadis (2010) further notes that no long-term 
development planning was designed during this boom period of the Greek economy (apart 
from monetary stability), while the increase in industrial activity was based on heavy state 
protectionism, which had distorting effects on overall development and did not prepare the 
country for its exposure to EU and international competition. In addition, industrial 
development of the period 1961-73 did not lead to the establishment of competitive sectors, 
based on modern technology and innovation. 
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rise in regional imbalances, reflected in the massive abandonment of 
many mountainous and insular communes, as a result of internal 
migration to the capital region and emigration abroad (as domestic 
employment creation in industrial and tertiary activities could not 
absorb the surplus farm labour). 
On the contrary, the period from the mid-70s until about the beginning 
of the ‘90s was less dynamic and efficient, characterized by a slowdown 
in growth rates (see Figure 3), the emergence of current account and 
public deficits and the rise of public debt to high proportions of GDP. We 
could say that the 1980s marked the entrance of the Greek economy 
into an era of macroeconomic imbalances, with an augmentation of the 
rates of unemployment and inflation. The worsening of the economic 
performance and the fiscal crisis that emerged was attributed by most 
analysts to the dramatic rise in the share of the state in the economy
10
 
(Alexiou, 2005; Halikias, 2011). While it is true that the augmentation of 
an unproductive state for ‘clientelist’ purposes has been greatly 
responsible for the worsening of fiscal magnitudes, many researchers 
have considered macroeconomic imbalances as “the direct impact of the 
country’s widening production deficit”, to which further pressures were 
exerted by the restrictive macroeconomic policies of the period 1985-
1997. Such policies, implemented through ‘stabilization programmes’, 
led, according to these writers, to a redistribution of income from labour 
to capital (expressed through “an increase in the share of profits and a 
reduction in the share of wages in total income”), a reduction of total 
                                                 
10
 Yet, the empirical results of a number of studies show that, in the case of Greece, selective 
state expenses exert a positive impact on economic performance and overall welfare, so 
that it is a restructuring of public expenses that is required rather than a general reduction 
(see for example Alexiou, p. 177). 
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gross investment, i.e. of capital accumulation, and a rise in 
unemployment (see for example, Argeitis, 2005: 72-75; Alexiou, 2005; 
Michailidis, 2009). Other researchers too have stressed the de-
industrialization that Greece experienced in the 1980’s “which signalled 
a restructuring of the traditional manufacturing industries” (Benos & 
Karagiannis, 2007: 16). A relative improvement in all magnitudes was 
observed since the mid-90s (see Figure 3) - most probably as a result of 
the first two stabilization programmes, aimed, among others, at 
achieving real convergence at the EU level – which allowed the country’s 
entrance to the Eurozone in 2001. New macroeconomic imbalances 
emerged since 2008 (the onset of the new global crisis), when a negative 
real GDP growth rate appeared. This outcome has been attributed to the 
unsustainable development model – entirely dependent on (private and 
public) consumption rather than investment (Halikias, 2011) - and by 
others to the ‘austerity measures’ applied in the previous decades - 
leading to chronically low domestic demand and public investments, 
strengthening the ‘supply deficit’/low competitiveness problem (Argeitis, 
2005). It is estimated that measures under the memorandum, signed 
between the Greek government and its lenders to deal with the current 
economic crisis, have led to further reductions in both public and private 
demand and consumption. As a result, the recession for 2012 is 
expected to be about 6% and unemployment rates to reach levels higher 
than 21% on average, and between 30 to 40% in the ages under 35
11
. 
                                                 
11
 In 2010, public debt constituted 142,8% of GDP and private debt 112% of GDP, so that 
total debt represented 255% of GDP, and the budget deficit reached 10,5% of GDP. For 
2012, public debt has been estimated to around 170% of GDP. 
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FIGURE 3: Real GDP, rates of growth & debt of Greece between 1950 
and 2010 
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Source: Reproduced from Halikias (2011). 
 
It is difficult to discern the impact of the above developments on 
regional inequalities, but a number of studies have dealt empirically or 
qualitatively with this issue. Petrakos and Saratsis (2000: 62) show 
empirically that, at least partly, regional inequalities in Greece decreased 
in the decade of the ’80s as result of the recession which characterized 
it. On the contrary, the recovery that followed increased regional 
inequalities since it began in the more advanced regions of the country. 
This is because the areas which attract a large proportion of economic 
activities and ‘modern’ sectors (notably Attica and Central Macedonia) 
are those to be first and more severely hit by international economic 
crises. More recently, however, some authors provide evidence on the 
relatively higher negative impact that the recent austerity measures 
(adopted within the framework of the memorandum) had on peripheral 
regions, mainly those more dependent on the public sector. 
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Monastiriotis, in particular (2011: 6, 8), claims that regions in the north 
and north-west of the country (i.e. Ipeiros, Western Macedonia and 
North Aegean) where public sector and pensions constitute over 50% of 
household incomes, while the shares of employment in the private 
sector are lowest and industrial bases weakest, could see a reduction in 
household incomes by as much as 40% more than in the capital and 
other higher income regions like South Aegean and Crete. A similarly 
regressive effect on peripheral incomes is likely to come from the 
reduction in the progressivity of income taxation following the decision 
to reduce the non-taxable income threshold. These effects are in turn 
likely to lead to lower incentives for private investments and further 
outmigration strengthening regional polarization.   
The deepening of European economic integration during the 1990s 
(initiated with Greece’s participation in the European Monetary Union in 
the beginning of the decade) strengthened the de-industrialization 
process in many industrial regions (mainly in northern Greece) which 
were not sufficiently diversified and lacked a significant tertiary sector to 
counterbalance the loss in productive potential, augmenting regional 
disparities from metropolitan centres. Thus, in the period 1981-2007, 
the GDP of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace was reduced from 6,78% to 
4,55% of the country average, while per capita GDP was reduced from 
88,6% to 67%. This is so, despite the fact that, between 1982 and 1994, 
development in many regions of northern Greece was encouraged by a 
number of ‘development laws’, which included special subsidies and 
privileges for private enterprises operating there. This support implied 
state participation up to 65%-80% of total investments (ΚΑTHIMERIΝI, 
2011).  
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Moreover, some writers point out that short periods of convergence 
appear to be temporary and to be followed by even stronger divergence 
from Attica (see for example Michailidis, 2009). As Figures 1 & 2 of this 
paper reveal, regional disparities seem to follow their own dynamic 
showing remarkable persistence overtime
12
. It should of course be 
emphasized that average regional disparities tend to conceal the 
substantial increase in the standard of living of many peripheral areas, as 
a result of farm subsidies granted within the framework of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), following Greece’s accession to the EC in 1981, 
or of other aids or incentives given to these areas. In consequence, 
consumption patterns throughout the country more or less converged 
with those in metropolitan centres and the traditional ‘rural-urban’ 
dichotomy, which was prevalent until about the ‘70s, ceased (see in 
footnote 7 the high share of services in gross value added of all regions). 
 
4. The role of regional policy 
Greek regional policy in the post-war period has been considered at best 
inadequate in limiting the gradual establishment of the polar 
development pattern, expressed in the strengthening of selected polar 
points in space, already enjoying significant agglomeration economies 
due to the concentration of people and economic activity there. In the 
1980s - a decade marked by Greek accession to the EC and the beginning 
of a prolonged recession which was to last until about the mid-90s - 
there was a shift in emphasis towards the model of localized 
endogenous development, following changes in the European regional 
                                                 
12
 This is also confirmed in the empirical analysis of the paper by Caraveli & Tsionas (2011). 
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policy model, aiming at the dispersion of responsibility to geographically 
lower administrative levels
13
 (Christofakis, 2001: 230). This was reflected 
in the Integrated Mediterranean programmes - IMP (1986-1992) - 
forerunner of the Community Support Frameworks (CSF) - the initiation 
of which coincided with the first ‘stabilization programme’ adopted by 
the Greek government in 1986
14
.  
While the IMP marked the shift of regional policy towards multi-annual 
programmes adapted to specific regional characteristics, the 1st CSF 
(1989-93) aimed at the reduction of regional inequalities by boosting 
small & medium enterprises (mainly in the area of tourism) and 
improving the regional transport network in order to upgrade rural 
regions; the 2nd CSF (1994-99) emphasized the improvement of large-
scale infrastructure works aiming at encouraging the country’s linkages 
with the international economy rather than encouraging development at 
the regional level; the 3rd CSF (2000-06) was marked by the country’s 
accession to the European Economic and Monetary Union in 2001 and 
focused in boosting employment at the regional level, through 
investments in human capital and information technology which would 
raise productivity & competitiveness. Given the shift in emphasis of the 
European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) towards rural development, 
after the adoption of the Rural Development Regulation in the 1999 
Berlin summit, this programme initiated special development criteria for 
                                                 
13
 The dispersion would be possible by adopting the principles of ‘subsidiarity’ and 
‘partnership’ of the Structural Funds. 
14
 According to many analysts, the ‘80s were marked by the entrance of the Greek economy 
to the ‘neo-liberal’ era – see previous section - in which the term regional cohesion is 
increasingly substituted by the term ‘competitiveness’ (see Michailidis, 2009). 
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mountainous and island regions (Caraveli, 2006)
15
. However, it also 
focused on the improvement of the relative position of the metropolitan 
regions, its ultimate aim being the strengthening of ‘regional external 
linkages’ (Christofakis, 2001; Kostopoulou, 2009).  
Despite the greater emphasis towards promoting development at the 
regional/local level in both the 1st and the 3rd programmes, results 
concerning convergence and socioeconomic cohesion on the intra-
national level and between Greek and EU regions have not been overall 
satisfactory, given that 8 out of the 13 regions still have a GDP below 
75% of the EU average. Some successful cases have certainly been 
recorded, reflected in the satisfactory economic performance of a 
number of (urban and rural) peripheral areas, but this does not change 
the overall picture. Continuous concentration of resources to large-scale 
projects (mainly in transport infrastructure) in specific regions has been 
considered an important reason for this failure, in combination with the 
usual ‘systemic’ factors, traditionally inhibiting the implementation of 
CSFs. Such factors are: the centralized institutional framework combined 
with the over-dispersion of works, bureaucratic inefficiencies leading to 
a low ‘absorption rate’, mismanagement or misuse of state funds due to 
the corrupt and clientelist relationship between state and society 
(Andreou and Papadakis, 2012: 103). 
In an increasingly globalized environment, pressures for further 
reduction of the traditional production model and the transition towards 
new dynamic and innovatory sectors will become stronger and failure to 
adjust at the regional level will have detrimental effects for regional 
                                                 
15
 These are the ‘integrated development programmes’, designed to be applied in selected 
zones of the country-side, aiming at boosting rural development. 
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development as well as for the overall macroeconomic imbalances. The 
current financial and economic crisis will reflect the structural 
characteristics of individual regions as well as their ‘resilience’
16
, 
revealing the inability of regions with a high share in traditional sectors 
of low competitive advantage (i.e. sectors based on low cost, low value-
added, with low level of labour force qualifications) to attract 
investments and create/maintain job opportunities. In the course of EU 
economic integration, industries subject to economies of scale tend to 
concentrate in old industrial centres of Europe (see Brulhart, 2001). This 
means that regional growth and development in the periphery of Europe 
should be based on investing in R&D and new technologies to compete 
in products and services with high technology content. For many Greek 
regions this might imply promoting the ‘green economy’, encouraging 
‘quality’ farm production, or innovative tertiary activities in rural areas 
(i.e. rural or alternative tourism), depending on the existing structure 
and orientation of the local economy (Caraveli, 2006). These have been 
regarded as strategic options which would compensate for losses in 
traditional industrial production, construction, (mass) tourism & 
transport where a high dependence in these sectors exists (Kotios and 
                                                 
16
 The term ‘regional resilience’, implying regional adaptation and recovery, is increasingly 
used in economic geography and evolutionary economics, due to its relevance to regions’ 
increasing exposure to globalization processes and international economic (but also 
environmental) crises. An important question within this framework is why some regions 
recover easily, while some others fail to do so. Globalization and trade liberalization may 
wipe out entire regional industries as a result of a new international and regional division of 
labour (Christofersen et al., 2010; Hassnik, 2010; Pike et al., 2010). Thus, the success of a 
region depends on current and past economic growth, employment rates, standards of living 
and quality of life. Whether this success will be maintained depends on the region’s 
resilience to economic recessions, globalization, etc. In turn, resilience depends on a number 
of factors, e.g. an innovative milieu leading to ‘learning’ or ‘knowledge activities’ in the 
region (e.g. a successful university with strong links with the regional economy), a skilled and 
innovative workforce, a modern productive infrastructure, a supportive financial system and 
a diversified economy not over-reliant on a single industry, a supportive regional 
government well networked nationally and internationally. 
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Tselios, 2009: 495; Commission of the EC, 2009; European Commission, 
2010; Neffke et al, 2009).  
The 2007-13 CSF, designed in the lines of the Lisbon Agenda, gives 
greater emphasis in territorial cohesion, which in the Treaty was added 
to the twin goals of economic and social cohesion (European 
Commission, 2007; 2011). This implied greater emphasis in the regional 
and local dimension of development, scheduled to be implemented 
through regional and local entrepreneurial programmes (Christofakis, 
2001: 228-229). Within this context rural development policy - an 
increasingly important component of European agricultural policy - and 
rural-urban linkages assume increased significance. In addition, the 
improvement of regional competitiveness was to be achieved once more 
by boosting investment in research and innovation and the development 
of knowledge-based sectors at the regional level 
17
(European 
Commission, 2007; 2011).  
The country is currently facing a new reality in which, ‘accidental’ or 
‘external’ factors are added to the traditional ‘systemic’ ones, seriously 
obstructing the implementation of the current programme, the National 
Strategic Reference Framework – ESPA (Andreou and Papadakis, 2012). 
This plan could be the key for some reversal in regional imbalances and, 
through this, for the country’s escape from the socio-economic impasse 
in which it is trapped. The basic new factor is of course the acute fiscal 
crisis and the ‘austerity’ measures adopted, which have led to cuts in 
                                                 
17
 Thus, although structural resources destined to poorer regions will have increased from 
56% of total inflows from the structural funds in 1989 to 85% by the end of the current 
period, this increase mainly concerns regions which will raise investment in research and 
innovation (European Commission, 2007). 
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regional public expenditure and investment. An additional factor is the 
country’s new administrative plan – Kallicrates - which involves a 
substantial reduction in the number of municipalities and a transfer of 
tasks to the new regional divisions, whose impact is still unclear (ibid: 
102). In view of the above, the possibility of implementing the current 
programme, as well as its efficiency and success in boosting regional 
growth and reducing disparities remains unclear. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Regional imbalances in Greece reveal the permanent structural 
imbalances in the country’s production model and the inefficiencies of 
macro-economic and regional policies followed in the past decades. 
Uneven geographical development, largely reflected in the core (Attica) - 
periphery (rest of regions) pattern, is based neither on the concentration 
of a strong, competitive, industrial sector nor of a strong ‘new economy’ 
sector (comprising a competitive, by international standards, financial 
sector and significant ‘knowledge-based’ activities). It is rather the result 
of urbanization economies, a large part of which stem from the 
concentration of inefficient public sector services
18
, in the capital region. 
Increasing economic integration at the regional (EU) or global level may 
have contributed to the sharpening of regional disparities by 
strengthening the more dynamic regions of the country, but at the same 
time, it can determine substantially growth prospects at the regional 
level. For many Greek regions, this might imply promoting alternative 
                                                 
18
 It should be noted that in Greece, the public sector corresponds to 40% of GDP and 25% of 
total employment, while more than 80% of public expenditure goes toward wages, salaries 
and pensions of these public sector workers (Bank of Greece, personal communication). 
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development paths, i.e. sectors (at the primary, secondary or tertiary 
level) based on innovation and ‘knowledge’ (including ‘green economy’ 
methods, farm production with ‘designation of origin’, ‘quality’ tourist 
services etc.), adapting to regional/local comparative advantages. Such 
paths would possibly compensate for losses in traditional low-
competitiveness activities. Both regional policy, currently implemented 
through the fourth CSF, and rural development policy of the CAP place 
particular emphasis to boosting regional resilience through these paths 
which can be the key for promoting social and regional cohesion at the 
national and EU levels. The current debt crisis and the fiscal measures 
which it brought about have obviously put strain on regional economies 
most heavily depended on public sector employment and investment, as 
some researchers have correctly pointed out. Already in the Europe 
2020 Strategy underlying the fifth Cohesion Report attention was 
brought to the fact that budget constraints would increasingly be a 
problem and that “closer links should be established between cohesion 
policy and macroeconomic reforms” (European Commission, 2011). The 
2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) emphasizes further 
the necessity “to bring deficit and debt into a more sustainable path…” 
(Ibid). This approach reflects a gradual shift in emphasis from cohesion 
policies towards those aimed at strengthening regional and national 
competitiveness, which is likely to put further strain on regional 
cohesion in peripheral MS. On the other hand, raising regional 
competitiveness on the above mentioned strategic lines (always 
acknowledging the risks that overreliance on exports can imply) could be 
the opportunity for the periphery’s revitalization promoting at the same 
time regional cohesion. For the current period, this requires the 
  23 
immediate implementation of the Regional Plan (with the smallest 
possible national participation). This in turn presumes political stability 
and insurance of Greece’s European orientation and participation in the 
Eurozone. 
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